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Abstract
When an experience good is being released on the market, experts’ opinions or grades are
supposed to give information about the quality of the good to future customers. However,
whether released experts’ opinion affects price setting by itself remains an empirical question
that seems difficult to answer. Actually, unobserved true quality of the good makes the
experts’ grades (supposed to be correlated with this quality) necessarily endogenous in any
"hedonic" price equation for experience goods. Using panel data on French Bordeaux wine
gathering information on prices, wine characteristics and wine tasters’ grades, we propose
a structural empirical approach à la Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) allowing to disentangle
the informative value of grades on quality from the sole direct effect of grades on price. Our
empirical results show that wine tasters’ grades affect positively price setting of "en primeur"
wine (that is, new vintages that have not been tasted by consumers) as well as unobserved
wine quality. Finally, the identified wine quality is shown to be correlated with weather
conditions at the growing season, an evidence consistent with Ashenfelter’s findings about
the effect of weather on prices of mature wines.
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1 Introduction
Since the work by Nelson (1970, 1974), experience goods (i.e., those goods for which quality
cannot be ascertained before effective consumption) have been the focus of extensive theoretical
as well as empirical research. The theoretical literature (Shaked and Sutton, 1982; Shapiro,
1983; Tirole, 1996; Mahenc and Meunier, 2003; among others) mainly considered firm’s activity
of quality signaling (through advertising, product labeling, reputation, etc.), while numerous
empirical studies (Ackerberg, 2003; Caves and Greene, 1996; Jin and Leslie, 2003; etc.) measured
the influence of these various sources of information on consumer demand. In this article, we
contribute to this literature by empirically testing the influence of experts’ reviews on the pricing
of experience goods. The influence of experts’ opinion (on consumer behavior) has been the focus
of recent empirical work, see Ginsburgh (2003) and Reinstein and Snyder (2005) for an analysis
of expert’s influence in the art and movie markets respectively.
In this paper, we measure the influence of experts’ grades on the pricing of "primeur" wine
by producers from the Bordeaux region (France). Primeur wine is a typical experience good as
it refers to a wine sold 6 to 8 months after the grape harvest. The wine, which is still in barrel
at the time of "primeur" sales, is not yet finished. Only the producer, who knows exactly what
happened during the grapes growing season and who followed each step of the wine making
process, is supposed to know the "true" quality of his wine.1 On the other hand, the only avail-
able information for consumers (and hence for econometricians) comes from reputation, labeling,
and experts’ judgment made during wine tasting sessions taking place before the opening of the
"primeur" market.
Most of the châteaux in the Bordeaux region (France) have a long-time established reputation
and a system of wine ranking, clearly labeled on the bottle, has been in existence since the
1From now on "true" wine quality will stand for the quality the wine will reach at maturity, assuming optimal
storage conditions.
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nineteenth century (Markham, 1997). Consumers can thus be assumed well informed about the
quality of the wine that was produced in the past. Quality of the wine is however likely to vary
from one vintage to another due in particular to the weather conditions that prevailed during
the grapes-growing season.2 There is thus some uncertainty remaining about wine quality when
the "primeur" market opens, and consumers are thus likely to rely on experts’ opinion. If the
producer believes that the consumer’s willingness to pay for the product is influenced by experts’
judgment, then he might price the good accordingly.
The main issue of this empirical work is that true quality, which is known by the producer
but unobserved by the consumer and the econometrician, will not only influence the pricing of
"primeur" wine, but true quality is also likely to be correlated with experts’ reviews. We thus face
a typical problem of omitted variable which may produce biased estimates if not controlled for.
This endogeneity problem cannot be solved through natural instrumental variables techniques
because it would require the availability of variables correlated with experts’ grades but not with
wine quality. Reinstein and Snyder (2005) faced the same endogeneity problem when measuring
the influence of movie critics on consumer demand, since, as stated in their paper, “products
receiving positive reviews tend to be of high quality, and it is difficult to determine whether
the review or the quality is responsible for high demand”. To circumvent the problem these
authors take advantage of the timing of the reviews relative to a movie’s release. Indeed, some
reviews came during the opening week-end while other reviews came only after. A difference-
in-differences estimator was thus applied using observations from this quasi-natural experiment.
The validity of this approach relies on the assumption that the selection of movies to be reviewed
during and after opening week-end is not correlated with quality reviews. The authors provide
several tests.
In this paper, we propose a different approach extending the one developed by Levinsohn and
2Contrary to most of New World wine regions or countries (California, South Africa, New Zealand, Chile,
etc.), weather conditions in the Bordeaux area can vary significantly from one year to another.
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Petrin (2003) in order to deal with unobserved productivity shocks when estimating production
functions. This approach, which would be usable even if one does not have data coming from
a natural experiment, exploits a structural assumption about the omitted variable. In our case,
this assumption links wine grades and wine unobserved quality. This procedure not only controls
for the omitted variable (unobserved wine quality in this particular study) but it also allows to
identify it.
Using an unbalanced panel data set of 108 Bordeaux châteaux over five vintages (1994-
1998), we find evidence that wine experts’ grades affect the choice of the "primeur" price by the
producer above the effect of unobserved wine quality. Our empirical results also show that failing
to control for endogeneity caused by the omission of unobserved quality leads to over-estimate
the influence of experts’ grade in the pricing of "primeur" wine.
This article also contributes to the growing literature on wine markets. Even if most of
the published work has focused on bottled wine (see Landon and Smith, 1997 and 1998, for an
analysis of consumer behavior, or Lecocq and Visser, 2003, for a review of hedonic price models),
econometric analysis of wine sold en primeur has also been the focus of recent work (see Hadj
Ali and Nauges, 2004, and Hadj Ali et al., 2005). These papers however did not address the
issue of unobserved quality.
2 Theoretical model, identification and estimation
The producer, who followed each step of the wine making process, is assumed to know the true
quality (or quality at maturity) of his wine, q∗. Moreover, since the wine maker is aware of all the
wine making process, it is usually acknowledged that he has more information than any other
person to assess the quality of his wine. We can reasonably assume that the producer will price
the wine sold on the primeur market, according to the true expected quality at maturity, q∗,
that experts try to assess and signal by revealing some grades after tasting. Experts’ grade are
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given during the wine tasting sessions that occur before the opening of the "primeur" market.
Producers’ pricing strategy may also depend on consumers’ expected willingness to pay for the
wine. The latter, who are not perfectly informed about quality, will likely refer to reputation,
labeling, or experts’ judgment to make their purchase decision. The choice of the "primeur"
price by the producer may thus be influenced by the grade, denoted q0, which is attributed to
his wine. We will test this assumption by introducing experts’ grade into the "primeur" price
function.
Thus, we can define a "primeur" price function as:
ln p = π(q∗, qo, x) + ε (1)
where p represents "primeur" price, qo is experts’ grade given to "primeur" wine, q∗ is true
wine quality known by the producer and ε is an idiosyncratic random shock on the wine growers
price setting such that E (ε | q∗, qo, x) = 0. x is a vector of other price determinants linked for
example to rank or region of origin.
2.1 Structural model
Writing the "primeur" price function (1) for château i and vintage t, and assuming that the
price function π(., ., .) is additively separable between q∗, qo, and x, we get:
ln pit = E (lnpit | q∗it, qoit, xit) + εit
= x0itβ + γq
o
it + q
∗
it + εit (2)
where β and γ are unknown parameters, and the coefficient of q∗it (which is unobserved) has
been normalized.
The wine quality q∗it being unobserved, we cannot identify coefficients β and γ, because
E (ln pit | qoit, xit) = x0itβ + γqoit +E (q∗it | qoit, xit)
5
and in general we will have
E (q∗it | qoit, xit) 6= 0.
Assuming that experts’ grade is uncorrelated with true wine quality is of course a very unrealistic
assumption since wine tasting is indeed performed in order to give information on the true
wine quality. Thus we face an endogeneity problem in (2) because experts’ opinion about the
experience good i at period t (qoit) is supposed to signal the unobserved quality of the good (q
∗
it).
Thus, unless experts’ grades are given completely at random with respect to the true quality of
the good, expert’s grade will be endogenous in the price equation.
A first simple solution would be to use instrumental variables to correct for this endogeneity
problem. But finding instrumental variables would mean that one observes variables correlated
with the wine grade, qoit, but not with unobserved wine quality, q
∗
it. In this particular example of
wine as an experience good, no natural instrumental variables appear to be available. One could
think of using lagged values of experts’ grades as potential instruments, i.e., grades attributed
to the wine from older vintages. However, these instruments will be valid only under the strong
assumption that the unobserved wine quality is not serially correlated which is not acceptable in
the present case. Finally, note that a fixed-effects specification, which is the common approach
to deal with unobserved heterogeneity in panel data, is not applicable in this particular case as
wine quality is not constant over vintages.
Thus, we propose a structural approach exploiting a non-parametric relationship between
unobserved quality and observed variables as well as orthogonality conditions about innovations
in unobserved quality. This approach is related to the one developed in Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) allowing to deal with unobserved productivity shock in production functions that make
input levels endogenous in the production function.
We define the innovation ξit to the unobserved quality conditionally on some information Iit
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with:
ξit = q
∗
it −E[q∗it|q∗it−1, Iit]. (3)
In practice, information variables, Iit, will correspond to variables, like weather conditions,
known before the wine grower can observe the realized wine quality, q∗it, at period t. The
innovation, ξit, represents random shocks that may have occurred during the grapes-growing
season and/or during the wine making process.
Our method relies on the following set of assumptions:
A1 The experts’ grade is such that
qoit = qt(q
∗
it, sit) (4)
where qt(., .) is monotonic in its first argument.
The grade attributed to "primeur" wine is written as a function of unobserved quality, q∗it,
and some observable grade shifters, sit.3 The monotonicity assumption means that experts’
grades are increasing with unobserved quality, i.e., wine ranking according to experts’ grades
match wine ranking according to unobserved quality, if the grade shifter variables sit are the
same.
Note that, instead of assumptionA1, one can also simply do the following weaker assumption
that is implied by A1:
A1b The true wine quality is such that
q∗it = q
∗−1
t (q
o
it, sit) (5)
where q∗
−1
t is an unknown function (not necessarily monotonous).
3Quality, q∗it, may be perceived by experts with some error. It corresponds to the case where the grade
attributed to the wine can be written as a function of q∗it − ζit and sit, where ζit is an i.i.d. perception error.
This extension is dealt with in the Appendix.
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Assumption A1b is implied by A1, and assumption A1 implies then that q∗
−1
t is the inverse
of qt (., .) with respect to its first argument.
Assumption A1 orA1b is of course very important in the method and is not testable. It is a
structural assumption that may seem more or less appropriate according to the good considered
and which in the present case means that the grades given to "en primeur" wine correctly rank
the wines in terms of unobserved quality (even if the absolute differences between qualities may
be wrongly represented by differences between grades).
A2 The random shock εit on the price setting equation is independent of observable price
determinants xit, grade shifters sit, and grade qoit:
E (εit|xit, sit, qoit) = 0. (6)
The endogeneity problem in (2) comes only from unobserved quality q∗it (because E (q
∗
itq
o
it) 6=
0 and no other omitted unobserved heterogeneity affects prices).
A3 We assume that there exists variables zit−1 that are uncorrelated with the innovation ξit
at period t:
E (ξitzit−1) = 0. (7)
Innovations ξit in wine quality can be interpreted as unobserved and unexpected idiosyncratic
shocks occurring during the wine growing process. Idiosyncratic innovations to wine quality
are uncorrelated with the variable zit−1 (which is granted by definition of the innovation if
zit−1 belongs to the information variables Iit). We also assume that the variables zit−1 are
uncorrelated with the error term εit in the price equation, i.e.,
E (εitzit−1) = 0. (8)
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2.2 Identification and estimation procedure
As in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), we develop an estimation procedure exploiting the longit-
udinal dimension of the data that allows to identify the structural model thanks to our main
orthogonality conditions described in A3. The “primeur” price model is assumed linear in the
parameters, that is:
ln pit = x
0
itβ + γq
o
it + q
∗
it + εit (9)
where γqoit is the effect of wine grade and q
∗
it the true quality. It can be written
ln pit = x
0
itβ + φit(q
o
it, sit) + εit (10)
where φit(q
o
it, sit) is defined as
φit(q
o
it, sit) = γq
o
it + q
∗−1
t (q
o
it, sit).
In the first-stage, the price model (10) which is linear in xit and non-parametric in φit(q
o
it, sit) is
estimated using a k-order polynomial expansion4 in qo and sit to approximate the non-parametric
function q∗t (., .):
ln pit = x
0
itβ +
kX
m=0
k−mX
n=0
ρmnq
om
it s
n
it + vit (11)
where E (vit | qoit, xit, sit) = 0 because of A2. An OLS estimation produces consistent estimates
of the β0s. A second step is necessary to identify the experts’ grade coefficient, γ.
The second stage starts by computing, up to a scalar constant, a prediction for the true quality
q∗it that we denote qˆ
∗
it. For any candidate value γ, let
qˆ∗it = φˆit − γqoit (12)
where φˆit =
Pk
m=0
Pk−m
n=0 bρmnqomit snit (bρmn coming from the OLS estimation of equation (11)).
Using these values, a consistent (non-parametric) approximation to E[qˆ∗it|qˆ∗it−1, Iit] is given by
4 In practice, we will use k=3 or 4.
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the predicted values dE[q∗it|q∗it−1, Iit] from the regression
qˆ∗it = b0 + b1qˆ
∗
it−1 + b2qˆ
∗2
it−1 + b3qˆ
∗3
it−1 + b4Iit +wit. (13)
Given βˆ, γ, and dE[q∗it|q∗it−1, Iit], the sample residual of the price function εit plus the innovation
ξit is dεit + ξit = lnpit − x0itβˆ − γqoit − dE[q∗it|q∗it−1, Iit]. (14)
Then, using the orthogonality conditions (7) and (8), the estimate γˆ of γ is defined as the
solution to the following
min
γ
X
i,t
³³
ln pit − x0itβˆ − γqoit − dE[q∗it|q∗it−1, Iit]´ zit−1´2 . (15)
By construction, the parameter γ is identified, which allows to disentangle the effects of true
quality, q∗it, and the effect of experts’ grade, γq
o
it, on the price thanks to equation (9). This is
important because then one can tell how much of the price variance is due to the wine quality
itself and how much to the wine grade. Finally, note that once we have identified the parameters
of the model, (12) shows that we can identify qˆ∗it = φˆit−γˆqoit, that is the unobserved wine quality.
Then, it is interesting to look at wine quality determinants by regressing qˆ∗it on some observed
variables ωit.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 The data and specification issues
The data, which were provided by one of the most famous broker house in Bordeaux, cover
"primeur" wine sales5 of 108 Bordeaux châteaux, over five vintages (from 1994 to 1998). Primeur
price is the price of a 75cl bottle in constant euro (1990 base). For each wine, we have data
on grades given by Robert Parker (one of the most famous wine experts) to each wine at the
5Only the price is observed. The data base does not contain any information on quantities sold by each château
at the time of "primeur" sales.
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time of “primeur” sales,6 as well as a set of wine characteristics gathering vintage, “appellation”
(the French equivalent of Protected Designation of Origin), and ranking. The database also
contains some information about total production (in hectoliter per year) from all the château’s
vineyards.7 We combine these data with weather data obtained from the firm Météo France.
Weather data consist in daily data at Mérignac in the Bordeaux Region on minimum and max-
imum temperature, hours of sunshine and rainfall for all years from 1994 to 1998.
The data base gathers châteaux belonging to ten different “appellations”: Haut Médoc
(HM), Margaux (MA), Moulis (MO), Pauillac (PA), Pessac Léognan (PL), Pomerol (POM),
Saint Emilion Grand Cru (SEGC), Saint Estèphe (SES), Saint Julien (SJ).
Some of these châteaux are ranked, either inside a region (i.e., a group of appellations) or
inside a unique appellation. There are three ranking systems currently in use in the Bordeaux
area:
1. The first ranking was created for wines from the Médoc region (appellations HM, MA,
MO, PA, SES, SJ). This ranking dates back to 18558 and has been largely unchanged
to this day. Wines have been classified following a five-tier classification system ranging
from top-quality Premiers Crus or First Growth (ME-1 from now on) to Cinquièmes Crus
or Fifth Growth (ME-5). Later on, in 1920, some of the non-ranked châteaux have been
classified in a sixth-group called Crus Bourgeois (ME-6).
2. Saint Emilion wines belonging to the SEGC appellation, formally classified in 1955 (sub-
sequently revised every ten years), follow a three-tier ranking system: Premiers Grands
6Tasting normally takes place in Spring of each year, before the opening of the “primeur” market. The tasting
is generally made in single-blind conditions, i.e., experts do not know the name of the château when judging the
wine. Wines are graded using a 50-100 scale.
7Each château may produce different wines (wines of different quality, sold under different names) from his
whole set of vineyards. We only observe total production which, in most cases, does not correspond to the
production of the wine followed in the database.
8See Markham (1997) for an history of the classification system.
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Crus Classés A (SE-1), Premiers Grands Crus Classés B (SE-2), and Grands Crus Classés
(SE-3).
3. Wine from the region of Graves (appellation Pessac Léognan) started to be officially clas-
sified in 1953.
Some of the châteaux belonging to the three-above cited regions (Médoc, Saint Emilion,
Graves) are not ranked. In the empirical analysis these châteaux will be gathered into the
“non-classified” group. This group will also include all the châteaux belonging to the Pomerol
appellation that has always refused to rank its own wines.
Tables 1 to 4 show descriptive statistics on "primeur" price and grade by appellation and by
rank.
[Tables 1 to 4 around here]
Robert Parker’s grade varied from 73 to 98 over the period, with an average of 87.47. Wines
belonging to the Haut Médoc and Margaux appellations got, on average over the 1994-1998
vintages, a lower grade than the other appellations in the database (Table 1). Table 2 shows the
average "primeur" price across vintages for each appellation. Primeur price varied significantly
from 3.61 to 86.02 euros per bottle, with an average of 15.59. On average over the period, wines
belonging to the Pomerol appellation were sold at the highest price, followed by wines from Saint
Emilion and wines from Pauillac. The highest ranks (ME-1 and SE-1) got the best grade on
average and were priced significantly above the average for all châteaux (Table 3 and Table 4).
The second-highest in the Médoc and in the Saint Emilion region (ME-2 and SE-2 respectively)
are priced significantly above the lower ranks from the same region. Note finally that the high
"primeur" price for non-classified wines is mainly driven by the wines from the Pomerol region,
and especially the famous Château Pétrus.
12
The "primeur" price model (1) assumes that the price depends on true quality, q∗, experts’
grade, qo, and a vector x of price determinants. We choose to include in x a dummy variable
for each "appellation", a dummy variable for each official ranking class, and a dummy variable
for each vintage. These three observable elements are labeled on each bottle of wine (ranking
is indicated as long as the wine is ranked). The ranking classification may also be considered
as an indirect measure for reputation (and maybe market power) of the château (Hadj Ali and
Nauges, 2004).
The consistency of our method relies first, on the choice of the proxy (sit) which, by assump-
tion, is uncorrelated with both the innovation and the error term in the price model, and, second,
on the validity of the orthogonality conditions (7) and (8). In our model, the sit variable is in-
terpreted as a variable affecting judgment on wine quality during tasting sessions of "primeur"
wine. Experts’ grade attributed at the time of primeur sales is intended to inform consumers on
expected wine quality at maturity. As experts taste a wine which is not yet finished (the wine
which is tasted is a wine which is still in barrels), its future quality (or quality at maturity)
is difficult to ascertain. Wine quality at maturity is likely to depend on quality at the time of
primeur sales, but also on weather conditions that prevailed during the grapes-growing season,
because weather conditions have an impact on wine’s development over the years. So, from one
vintage to another, experts may have different beliefs about overall quality based on general
weather information or conveyed by the producers themselves. Weather conditions appears as
natural candidates for the vector of proxies, sit. To check for the robustness of our results, we
will also consider as an additional proxy, some estimates of (unobserved by the econometrician)
inputs affecting the wine making process that could be assessed by experts and that we measure
by the unexplained part of observed wine production (see below for greater details).
As for the variable zit−1 to be used in (15), we will consider three possible candidates: a
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constant, cumulative rainfall in year t− 1 (from January to September), and cumulative hours
of sunshine in year t − 1 (from January to September). Weather conditions in year t − 1 can
be reasonably assumed to be uncorrelated with the error term of the price equation and the
innovation, both written at time t.
One also has to choose the set of information variables, Iit, to enter the definition of the
innovation equation. We will present estimation results corresponding to three different sets:
I1) weather variables (cumulative rainfall and hours of sunshine from January to September,
standard deviation of rainfall and hours of sunshine, from January to September), I2) weather
variables (I1) + production by château i in year t, I3) weather variables (I1) + appellation
dummies.
3.2 Estimation results and tests on vintage quality and the weather
Main estimates of the model:
We report in Table 5 estimation results obtained using our structural model, where:
a) the information set contains four weather variables: cumulative rainfall and hours of
sunshine from January to September, standard deviation of rainfall and hours of sunshine, from
January to September, all for year t.
b) the proxy variables are cumulative rainfall and hours of sunshine from January to Septem-
ber, in year t.
c) the zit−1 variable in equation (15) is the constant term.
We also report estimated coefficients using a simple OLS regression, which does not take
into account the endogeneity of Parker’s grade.
[Table 5 around here]
The estimated effect of Parker’s grade is larger when using OLS relative to the structural
model, showing that failing to control for unobserved quality leads to an over-estimation of
14
the impact of Parker’s judgment on the "primeur" price. The endogeneity bias is thus quite
significant. The estimated impact of experts’ grade is found equal to 1.31 (significant at the 10%
level) showing evidence that experts’ opinion influence the choice of "primeur" price. In other
words, once the "primeur" price has been chosen based on objective wine characteristics and on
quality, an additional premium is added which depends on experts’ judgment. This premium
is such that a one percentage-point increase on the average grade increases the "primeur" price
by 1.3%. These results would tend to confirm the idea that Robert Parker is influential in the
Bordeaux area (see Hadj Ali et al., 2005, for a discussion of Robert Parker’s role in the Bordeaux
region). However, our results are not directly comparable to the ones reported in Hadj Ali et al.
(2005) as these authors consider "primeur" sales in a different period (2002-2003) and measure
the impact on the "primeur" price of being graded by Robert Parker. For the first time, in 2003,
Robert Parker wine grades have been published in autumn, after the prices were determined
by the producers. Combining these data with observations on prices and grades from 2002, the
authors estimate the effect of being graded by Parker using a difference-in-differences procedure.
They find an overall effect equal to almost 3 euros per bottle. As stated in their paper, the
validity of this approach relies on the so-called “parallel trend assumption” which states that,
“had Parker not graded any wine in two subsequent years, the price evolution would have been
the same for all wines”. In our case, we do not rely on such assumption.
Ranking is also found to have a significant influence on the pricing of "primeur" wine. Wines
belonging to all ranks, except top-growths from the Médoc region (ME-1) and second-growths
from the Saint-Emilion region (SE-2), are priced significantly below the top-growths of Saint-
Emilion (SE-1) which were taken as the reference group. The rank effect provides an indirect
measure of a reputation premium and may also reflect the market power of châteaux belonging
to top-growths ranking (Hadj Ali and Nauges, 2004). Appellation groups do not come out sig-
nificantly in the estimated model.
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Robustness check:
We now run several specification tests in order to check the robustness of our findings. In
particular, we re-estimate the model using different sets of proxies, information variables in the
innovation equation, and zit−1 variables to be used in equation (15). Until now, cumulative
rainfall and cumulative hours of sunshine (from January to September) in year t have been used
as proxies (our sit variables). We propose to include as an additional proxy the residual from
a regression fitting production. We estimate a linear model where total production of château
i in year t is regressed on vintage dummies, and a large of set of weather variables. We also
include unobservable château effects, assumed constant over time. The model is estimated using
a Within estimation technique. The estimated residual (including the estimated château effect)
is denoted by uˆhit and is used as an extra proxy. The estimated residual of the production model
seems a good candidate for the set of proxy variables as it is likely to capture, in addition to
unobserved château specific effects, unobserved inputs to production that could also be correlated
with unobserved wine quality.
Until now, we have been using as information variables in the innovation equation (Iit), a
set of four weather variables: cumulative rainfall and hours of sunshine, standard deviation of
rainfall and hours of sunshine, all four variables computed over the January-September period.
We consider two extended sets of information variables: 1) weather variables + production of
château i in year t; 2) weather variables + appellation dummies.
Also, the zit−1 variable in equation (15) was the constant term. We now try two other
variables: cumulative rainfall over the January-September period in year t− 1, and cumulative
hours of sunshine over the January-September period in year t− 1.
We re-estimate the model combining these different assumptions. We present the estimated
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coefficient of Parker’s grades in Table 6.9 Estimated effect of Parker’s grade is found to be
quite robust to the settings. Under different sets of information variables, proxy variables, and
variables zit−1 considered in (15), the estimated effect of Parker’s grade, when significant, is
found to lie in the range 1.3-1.4.
[Table 6 around here]
Finally, we test whether the estimated effect of Parker’s grade change if some of the wines are
removed from the sample. Estimates of the coefficient associated to Parker’s grade are shown
in Table 7.
[Table 7 around here]
Results show that the estimated coefficient of Parker’s grade is not very sensitive to the
removal of some wines, either from some particular region or quality ranking.
Analysis of predicted wine quality:
A nice feature of our approach is that it allows to recover estimates of the unobserved quality,
q∗it, for each château i and vintage t. In this section, we propose to test the validity of our quality
estimates by analyzing their correlation with other factors such as experts’ grade, rank dummies,
vintage years, and weather conditions.10
The consistency of our approach relies on the structural assumption A1 that experts’ grade,
q0, can be written as a function of wine quality, q∗it, and grade shifters or proxies, sit. As
explained before, weather variables appeared to be natural candidates for the vector of proxies.
A simple test for this relationship is to compute simple correlation coefficients between, on the
one hand, expected wine quality as predicted by our model, qˆ∗it, and experts’ grade, and weather
9Full estimation results are not shown here but are available upon request.
10We predict wine quality from the coefficients estimated with the structural approach and displayed in Table
5.
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variables, on the other hand. Correlation coefficients along with probability values corresponding
to the significance level of each correlation coefficient, are shown in Table 8.
[Table 8 around here]
Correlation coefficients have the expected signs and are all significant at the 1% level. Cor-
relation coefficient between experts’ grade and predicted wine quality is 0.29.11 Predicted wine
quality is found positively correlated with cumulative hours of sunshine over the January-
September period (correlation coefficient is 0.48), and negatively correlated with cumulative
rainfall over the same period (correlation coefficient is -0.41).12
Evidence about the effect of weather on wine quality is consistent with Ashenfelter’s findings
(see Ashenfelter et al., 1995, for a discussion of the relationship between weather conditions
and vintage quality), even after disentangling unobserved wine quality from the pure signaling
effect of experts’ grading on price. Ashenfelter et al. (1995) show that the quality for red
Bordeaux wines, based on the price of mature wines, can be predicted by weather conditions
observed during the grapes-growing season. Here, we find evidence that wine quality known
by the producer and taken into account for the pricing of "en primeur" wine, can actually be
explained by the weather conditions during the grapes-growing season. It is remarkable that
such consistent evidence can be found also on the quality as identified by our structural model
after disentangling quality effects from experts’ opinion effects in the price determination of
primeur wine.
Simple statistics on predicted wine quality by quality ranking are shown in Table 9. On
average, our wine quality estimates are found to match the official quality rankings. The greatest
predicted wine qualities are obtained for wines classified as first top-growths in the Médoc and
11Graphical tests show that the relationship between experts’ grade and wine quality is monotonic. The graph
is not shown here but is available from the authors upon request.
12Note that correlation coefficients between experts’ grade and weather variables are never found significantly
different from 0.
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Saint Emilion regions (ME-1 and SE-1, respectively). Our predictions of wine quality, on average,
match the overall ranking in the Saint Emilion region. In the Médoc region, we do not find much
differences in quality across wines belonging to ranks ME-3, ME-4, and ME-5. Wines in the
Graves region (GR ranking) have a predicted quality which is in the range of the predicted
quality of Médoc wines classified as ME-3 or ME-4. The high predicted wine quality for wines
in the non-classified group is explained by the presence in this group of famous wines from the
Pomerol region (like Château Pétrus).
[Table 9 around here]
We show in Table 10 simple statistics on predicted wine quality for each of the vintages
from 1994 to 1998, and corresponding distributions on Figure 1. Wines from vintages 1995
and 1998 are generally considered by all wine experts as the best wines over the period. On
average, our model predicts the highest qualities in 1997 and 1998, but predicted quality in 1995
is not as high. Interestingly, the 1997 vintage is described as the highest quality vintage by
our model. At the time of primeur sales (in Spring 1998), the 1997 vintage was described as a
"bad year" by experts. However the latter changed their mind few years after and assessed that
their first judgment was wrong and that Bordeaux wines from 1997 would be of high quality
when reaching maturity. Our methodology thus seems to manage to detect the fact that 1997
is a good wine vintage by disentangling the effect of experts’ grades from the true quality in
the pricing equation of wine producers that are better informed to assess the wine quality at
maturity.
[Table 10 and Figure 1 around here]
4 Conclusion
Using panel data on French Bordeaux wine gathering information on prices, wine characteristics
and wine tasters’ grade, our empirical results show that wine tasters’ grades affect positively
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price setting of en "primeur" wine (that is, new vintage that has not been tasted by consumers)
above the effect of unobserved wine quality. This empirical illustration using data on "primeur"
wine also emphasizes that not controlling for unobserved quality leads to over-estimate the
impact of experts’ information. The estimation procedure exploits the structural assumption
between wine grades and unobserved wine quality. One of its nice features is that it allows to
recover estimates of unobserved wine quality by disentangling wine quality from the effect of
grades on wine prices. Finally, we show evidence that the identified unobserved wine quality
is actually correlated with weather conditions as already demonstrated using prices of mature
wines by Ashenfelter et al. (1995).
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Appendix: The case of a perception error
The case where the perceived quality is not the true quality because of a perception error can
also be handled. It corresponds to the case where the grade attributed to the wine can be
written as a function of q∗it − ζit and sit, where ζit is an i.i.d. perception error:
qoit = qt(q
∗
it − ζit, sit). (16)
Contrary to Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), we now allow the function relating q∗it and q
o
it not to
be deterministic since it is affected by unobserved shocks ζit. The interpretation of the error ζit
as a perception or reporting error depends on whether one assumes that experts do observe or
not q∗it at period t. If one can assume that it is observed by them, then ζit is more a "reporting
error", if one assume that they do not yet observe perfectly q∗it then ζit is a "perception error".
We first need to assume that the perception error about quality is uncorrelated with grade
shifters sit:
E (ζitsit) = 0.
We develop our estimation procedure similarly. The “primeur” price model is assumed linear in
the parameters, that is:
ln pit = x
0
itβ + γq
o
it + q
∗
it + εit, (17)
where γqoit is the effect of wine grade and q
∗
it the true quality.
It can be written
ln pit = x
0
itβ + φit(q
o
it, sit) + ζit + εit (18)
where φit(q
o
it, sit) is defined as
φit(q
o
it, sit) = γq
o
it + q
∗−1
t (q
o
it, sit).
Now qoit is endogenous because correlated with ζit. We thus need to use some instrumental
variables for qoit that would not be correlated with the perception error ζit. Remark that while
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it is difficult to think about any instrumental variable that would be correlated with qoit but not
with unobserved quality q∗it, it is easier to think about an instrumental variable correlated with
qoit (and q
∗
it) but not the perception error ζit.
If one wants to estimate φit(q
o
it, sit) non-parametrically, then one has to use non-parametric
instrumental variables techniques (Newey and Powell (2003) and Darolles, Florens and Renault
(2003)). Then, in the first-stage, the price model (10) which is linear in x and non-parametric in
φit(q
o
it, sit), is estimated consistently, which provides φˆit. A second step is necessary to identify
the experts’ grade coefficient γ.
The second stage starts by computing, up to a scalar constant, a prediction for the perceived
true quality q∗it − ζit that we denote qˆ∗ζit. For any candidate value γ∗, let
qˆ∗ζit = φˆit − γ∗qoit. (19)
Using these values, a consistent (non-parametric) approximation to E[qˆ∗ζit|qˆ∗ζit−1, Iit] is given by
the predicted values dE[q∗ζit|q∗ζit−1, Iit] of the regression
qˆ∗ζit = b0 + b1qˆ
∗
ζit−1 + b2qˆ
∗2
ζit−1 + b3qˆ
∗3
ζit−1 + b4Iit +wit. (20)
Then, using the fact that q∗ζit = q
∗
it− ζit and denoting κit = E[q∗it|q∗it−1, Iit]−E[q∗it|q∗ζit−1, Iit] the
error in the innovation due to the conditioning on q∗ζit−1 instead of q
∗
it−1, we have
q∗it −E[q∗it|q∗ζit−1, Iit] = ξit + κit.
Using E[ζit|q∗ζit−1, Iit] = 0, we have
q∗ζit −E[q∗ζit|q∗ζit−1, Iit] = q∗it −E[q∗it|q∗ζit−1, Iit] + ζit
= ξit + κit + ζit.
Given βˆ, γ∗, and dE[q∗it|q∗it−1, Iit], the sample residual of the price function εit plus the innovation
ξit and the perception error ζit is
dεit + ζit + κit + ξit = lnpit − x0itβˆ − γ∗qoit − dE[q∗ζit|q∗ζit−1, Iit].
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Then, the estimate γˆ of γ is defined as the solution to the following
min
γ∗
X
i,t
³³
lnpit − x0itβˆ − γ∗qoit − dE[q∗it|q∗ζit−1, Iit]´ zit−1´2 ,
where zit−1 is a valid instrumental variable. Moreover, these errors being independent and
identically distributed, we have E
³
q∗ζit | q∗it
´
= q∗it so that the average of q
∗
ζit for a given château,
over vintages, is a consistent estimator of the average of q∗it over vintages. Also the average of
q∗ζit over a set of châteaux is a consistent estimator of the average of q
∗
it over a set of châteaux
for a given vintage t.
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Tables
Table 1: “Primeur” grade by appellation (average across vintages)
Number of Mean Std. Min. Max.
châteaux Dev.
Médoc
Haut Médoc (HM) 10 85.05 2.85 77 90
Margaux (MA) 16 85.65 4.20 75 98
Moulis (MO) 3 86.39 1.95 83.5 90
Pauillac (PA) 18 88.32 3.89 73.5 96
Saint Estèphe (SES) 8 87.14 3.95 75 93
Saint Julien (SJ) 10 88.49 2.48 83.5 95
Saint Emilion
Saint Emilion Grand Cru (SEGC) 19 88.13 3.43 77 94.5
Graves
Pessac Léognan (PL) 16 88.00 2.65 79.5 92
Pomerol (POM) 8 87.96 4.56 73 95.5
Overall 108 87.47 3.72 73 98
Table 2: “Primeur” price by appellation, in euro/bottle (average across vintages)
Number of Mean Std. Min. Max.
châteaux Dev.
Médoc
Haut Médoc (HM) 10 7.05 2.70 3.61 15.22
Margaux (MA) 16 13.32 11.20 5.00 66.17
Moulis (MO) 3 8.40 1.57 6.28 10.32
Pauillac (PA) 18 18.41 15.37 5.70 66.17
Saint Estèphe (SES) 8 13.62 8.24 5.87 37.05
Saint Julien (SJ) 10 14.68 6.34 7.09 33.08
Saint Emilion
Saint Emilion Grand Cru (SEGC) 19 19.26 15.77 6.25 86.02
Graves
Pessac Léognan (PL) 16 13.38 4.34 7.23 27.32
Pomerol (POM) 8 20.90 14.44 6.67 55.93
Overall 108 15.59 12.26 3.61 86.02
27
Table 3: “Primeur” grade by rank (average across vintages)
Number of Mean Std. Min. Max.
châteaux Dev.
Médoc
ME-1 4 92.48 2.28 88 98
ME-2 12 88.81 3.95 75 95.5
ME-3 8 85.92 3.11 75 91.5
ME-4 9 86.91 2.04 80 91.5
ME-5 13 86.75 3.52 73.5 95
ME-6 16 84.78 3.39 75 90
Saint Emilion
SE-1 1 91.70 1.15 90.5 93
SE-2 5 88.13 3.44 79 94.5
SE-3 11 87.90 3.50 77 93.5
Graves 11 87.58 2.59 79.5 91.5
Non-classified 18 88.05 3.96 73 95.5
Overall 108 87.47 3.72 73 98
Table 4: “Primeur” price by rank (average across vintages)
Number of Mean Std. Min. Max.
châteaux Dev.
Médoc
ME-1 4 43.74 15.67 25.01 66.17
ME-2 12 18.45 8.46 7.09 37.05
ME-3 8 10.15 2.10 6.81 15.88
ME-4 9 10.72 2.99 5.74 15.88
ME-5 13 10.55 4.11 5.70 26.47
ME-6 13 7.87 2.79 3.61 15.22
Saint Emilion
SE-1 1 62.68 23.48 31.96 86.02
SE-2 5 20.84 9.47 9.45 43.67
SE-3 11 13.36 5.70 6.95 24.48
Graves 11 12.87 3.89 7.23 20.85
Non-classified 18 18.45 12.79 6.25 55.93
Overall 108 15.59 12.26 3.61 86.02
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Table 5: Estimation of the price equation - 392 observations (108 châteaux)
Dependent variable: ln pit Structural model OLS(a)
List of explanatory variables: Coef.(b) Std. Err. Coef.(b) Std. Err.
Parker’s grade (log qoit) (bγ) 1.306* 0.757 3.946*** 0.414
Médoc (appellation groups)
Haut Médoc -0.536* 0.313 -0.613*** 0.160
Margaux -0.318 0.303 -0.444*** 0.153
Moulis -0.359 0.307 -0.441** 0.186
Pauillac -0.232 0.294 -0.325** 0.143
Saint Estèphe -0.193 0.282 -0.311** 0.158
Saint Julien -0.220 0.309 -0.313** 0.158
Saint Emilion (appellation groups)
SEGC -0.647 0.455 -0.641*** 0.156
Graves (appellation groups)
Pessac Léognan -0.188 0.247 -0.286** 0.125
Pomerol . . . .
Vintages
1997 vintage . . 0.464*** 0.039
1998 vintage . . 0.380*** 0.041
Médoc (ranking system)
ME-1 -0.781 0.696 -0.674*** 0.248
ME-2 -1.442** 0.699 -1.422*** 0.248
ME-3 -1.718** 0.704 -1.729*** 0.252
ME-4 -1.792** 0.712 -1.812*** 0.250
ME-5 -1.835*** 0.708 -1.850*** 0.245
ME-6 -1.899*** 0.693 -1.908*** 0.252
Saint Emilion (ranking system)
SE-1 . . . .
SE-2 -0.861 0.666 -0.958*** 0.146
SE-3 -1.293** 0.659 -1.375*** 0.142
Graves (ranking system)
GR -1.674** 0.731 -1.701*** 0.237
Non-classified -1.603 0.693 -1.681*** 0.200
(a): constant not shown in OLS estimates.
(b): ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicates significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level respectively.
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Table 6: Estimated coefficient of Parker’s grade (standard error in parentheses)
Innovation equation, set of information variables (Iit)
Variable (zit−1) Weather conditionst(a) Weather conditionst Weather conditionst
and set of proxies (sit) + Productionit(b) + Appellation dummiesi
1) zit−1 =constant
sit={RAINt, SUNt} 1.306∗ (0.757) 1.132 (0.860) 1.315∗ (0.777)
sit={RAINt, SUNt, uˆhit} 1.425
∗ (0.749) 1.328∗ (0.748) 1.592∗ (0.914)
2) zit−1 =RAINt−1
sit={RAINt, SUNt} 1.125 (0.737) 0.988 (0.956) 1.125 (0.844)
sit={RAINt, SUNt, uˆhit} 1.494
∗ (0.768) 1.347∗ (0.754) 1.610∗ (0.906)
3) zit−1 =SUNt−1
sit={RAINt, SUNt} 1.419∗∗ (0.667) 1.246 (0.954) 1.436∗∗ (0.670)
sit={RAINt, SUNt, uˆhit} 1.432
∗ (0.715) 1.348∗ (0.775) 1.606∗ (0.905)
Definition of variables:
RAINt: cumulative rainfall from January, 1, to September, 30 (year t).
SUNt: cumulative hours of sunshine from January, 1, to September, 30 (year t).
uˆhit: residual from the production model (château i, year t).
(a): includes RAINt, SUNt, SDRAINt (standard deviation of rainfall over Jan 1 - Sep 30),
SDSUNt (standard deviation of hours of sunshine over Jan 1 - Sep 30).
(b): Production (hl) for château i in year t.
Table 7: Estimated impact of Parker’s grade - different sub-samples
Number of Structural Model OLS
châteaux Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Whole sample 108 1.306* 0.757 3.946*** 0.414
All wines except
wines from the Médoc region 43 2.084** 0.883 5.075*** 0.753
wines from the Saint Emilion region 89 1.386* 0.743 3.926*** 0.460
top-growths (ME-1 and SE-1) 103 1.352** 0.668 3.912*** 0.426
wines from ME-1, ME-2, SE-1 and SE-2 86 1.425** 0.606 3.999*** 0.457
(a): ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicates significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level respectively.
30
Table 8: Correlation coefficients between predicted quality and other variables
Correlation coefficient between
predicted quality and(a)
Experts’ grade 0.2885 (0.0000)
Cumulative hours of sunshine 0.4837 (0.0000)
Cumulative hours of rainfall -0.4080 (0.0000)
Standard deviation of hours of sunshine 0.3366 (0.0000)
Standard deviation of hours of rainfall -0.1450 (0.0040)
(a): p-value corresponding to the significance level of each correlation coefficient in parentheses.
Table 9: Statistics on predicted quality, by rank
Mean Std Dev. Min Max
ME-1 0.334 0.124 0.182 0.544
ME-2 0.281 0.118 0.127 0.528
ME-3 0.232 0.047 0.155 0.322
ME-4 0.241 0.062 0.126 0.364
ME-5 0.249 0.089 0.139 0.598
ME-6 0.225 0.069 0.125 0.486
SE-1 0.325 0.118 0.170 0.443
SE-2 0.270 0.119 0.124 0.540
SE-3 0.267 0.108 0.139 0.470
GR 0.240 0.069 0.136 0.368
Non-classified 0.280 0.167 0.093 0.767
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Table 10: Statistics on predicted quality,
by vintage
Mean Std Dev. Min Max
1994 0.176 0.044 0.093 0.368
1995 0.206 0.049 0.111 0.446
1996 0.284 0.096 0.133 0.671
1997 0.344 0.121 0.148 0.720
1998 0.302 0.100 0.145 0.767
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Figure 1: Distribution of predicted wine quality, by vintage
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